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Paying People to Be Healthy
As we struggle with the growing burden of chronic disease, “User Financial Incentives” (UFIs) are attracting international attention once again (1). Can we 
incentivize people to quit smoking or lose weight, for example, 
by offering them cash for desired outcomes? Are such policies as 
effective as or more effective than traditional health promotion 
policies? Are there unintended consequences? 
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein introduced the language of 
“the nudge” (2)—shifting the choice architecture within which 
individuals make decisions—in 2008, but the idea of bribing 
individuals to behave well is as old as parenthood itself. In 2010, 
Time Magazine reported on a four-city experiment designed to 
determine whether paying children for good grades was effective. 
The experiment attracted positive responses from the children 
and somewhat less support from parents, but few people were 
indifferent. Apparently, the scientist behind the project received 
death threats (3). The mixed results of the randomized controlled 
experiment designed to test the effectiveness of the intervention 
suggest the complexity of the policy: kids did better when the 
incentives were paid for things children could directly control 
such as reading books or attending class, but less well when 
bribes were given for outcomes such as better grades over which 
the children receiving the incentive had only limited control (4).
Similar results have been found elsewhere: in 2007, New 
York City (5) run an anti-poverty program on the basis of 
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Abstract
User Financial Incentives (UFIs) have emerged as a powerful tool 
for health promotion. Strong evidence suggests that large enough 
incentives paid to individuals conditional on behaviour they can 
control encourages more of the desired behaviour. However, such 
interventions can have unintended consequences for non-targeted 
behaviours. Implementation difficulties that result in individuals not 
understanding the nature of the incentive, unintended opportunities 
to “game” the system and inefficient roll-outs, can dampen results. 
Moreover, the legitimacy of paternalistic interventions by health 
planners requires careful consideration if we accept that the families 
involved will almost certainly be better judges of their own best 
interests than outsiders. 
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successes achieved in Mexico’s Oportunidades Program (began 
as PROGRESA in 1997) and Brazil’s Bolsa Familia Program 
(6). These Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) schemes, since 
replicated elsewhere, showed that substantial improvements 
could be achieved in health and educational outcomes when 
payments to families are conditional on particular behaviours 
such as taking children to clinics or attending school. Overall, 
the New York City program showed that similar schemes could 
also lead to beneficial outcomes in wealthy countries such as 
the US; at least some improvements in children’s educational 
outcomes in high school, parents’ work efforts, savings and 
family health outcomes appeared early despite significant 
challenges associated with implementation. In the New York 
experiment, as in other cases, chaotic roll-outs left some 
participants uncertain about the details of the program and the 
expected behaviour.
The importance of carefully targeting the behaviour to 
be incentivized emerges in study after study. In Malawi,  a 
randomized controlled experiment developed to encourage 
adolescent girls to attend school and achieve better grades was 
designed with two arms, as well as a control. In one arm, the 
families received cash transfers conditional on school attendance 
and in the second, they received an Unconditional Cash Transfer 
(UCT). Both the CCT and UCT encouraged school attendance 
relative to the control, but the CCT was much more effective 
(7). As in the New York experiment, it was easy to incentivize 
school attendance but performance was more difficult to affect. 
Nevertheless, in Malawi as elsewhere, a large enough payment, 
well understood and well directed, can encourage people to 
engage in more of the incentivized behaviour. Less direct goals 
of the intervention —performance on tests, for example, which 
are not a condition of payment—are less likely to be achieved. 
The most significant outcome of the Malawi experiment, 
however, is that a CCT conditional on educational behaviour 
might have other indirect effects, such as changing sexual 
behaviour and influencing health outcomes. Daughters of 
families in both the UCT and CCT arms were less likely to 
test positive for HIV and Herpes simplex than those in the 
control arm, even though sexual behaviour was not targeted 
(8). This finding raises significant questions about how targeting 
particular behaviours might affect outcomes. 
The UCT arm was much less effective than the CCT arm 
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at encouraging school attendance, which was the targeted 
behaviour. The CCT arm was also more cost-effective, both 
because the targeted behaviour was more prevalent among 
participants in this arm and because CCT families who did not 
meet the condition did not receive payments, while all the UCT 
families continued to receive payouts. The health outcomes, 
however, cast some additional light on the mechanism by which 
the cash transfers affect behaviour. When families receive a 
transfer conditional on daughters attending school, there is a 
strong incentive for families to ensure that the children do so. The 
poorest and most marginalized families, however, are less likely 
than others to react to the incentive by sending their daughters 
to school because families who face larger disincentives in the 
form of inadequate transportation or child care, for example, 
or greater reliance on child labour, need a greater “nudge” to 
overcome the barrier. For some, the bribe is simply not big 
enough to encourage them to educate their daughters. These 
poorest families will not receive payments if they are registered 
in the CCT arm, but will if they are in the UCT arm. What are 
the consequences for their daughters? The payment may not 
have been large enough for families to send these young women 
to school, but it could be large enough to serve as a barrier to 
early marriage or transactional sex. These are not targeted 
behaviours, but are desirable outcomes nonetheless. While 
these families would have been completely abandoned in the 
CCT arm, those in the UCT arm still benefit from the increased 
resources which they use in ways they perceive to be in their 
own best interests. The most vulnerable girls benefit most from 
UCTs, and benefit in ways not built as incentivized behaviour 
into the experiment (9).
The results of the Malawi experiment are significant because 
they suggest that not only must we be careful to target behaviour 
under the direct control of those who receive the payments, but 
that non-targeted behaviours might also be affected.  This goes 
to the heart of the matter.
CCTs and UFIs are both aspects of what has been labelled 
liberal paternalism. While traditional development economics 
and much of the health promotion is overtly paternalistic, for 
example educational programs designed to change behaviour by 
addressing perceived misinformation about vaccination or laws 
to prevent undesirable behaviour such as smoking in public 
places, CTs and UFIs appear to allow individual families to make 
their own decisions—subject only to the “nudge” of the scientist. 
Like a tobacco taxes, these schemes represent just another price 
for a rational (or not) consumer to consider, as he or she ambles 
about optimizing outcomes subject to a variety of constraints.
The paternalism is, however, very real and carries with it the 
same sorts of threats and risks as other forms of paternalism. 
What if the scientists target the wrong outcome? We know from 
the educational interventions that targeting results rather than 
behaviours are less effective in generating desired outcomes, 
but it is the Malawi results that are most telling. Left to their 
own devices, individuals and families behave in ways that they 
believe will be in their own best interests. Given unconstrained 
resources in the form of UCTs, they will use the resources to 
pursue outcomes they believe will make them better off. The 
fact that many of the UCT families increased investment in 
their daughters’ education suggests that their goals are different 
only in degree from those of the social planner. The better 
health outcomes achieved by the poorest families in the UCT 
arm simply suggest that, left to their own devices, families really 
do know how to best allocate their own resources in order to 
achieve their own goals. Their goals, however, may differ from 
those of the social planner. 
Returning to the issues with which I began: can UFIs affect 
individual behaviour? Clearly, incentives can affect behaviour. 
If they target behaviours over which individuals have control, 
are large enough, are well understood by participants and are 
delivered in an efficient manner perceived to be just, they can 
have substantial effects on outcomes. Are such incentives as 
good as or better than traditional forms of health promotion? 
The jury is still out; comparative research does not exist. Might 
UFIs have unintended consequences? Human behaviour is 
complex. We ought to at least contemplate the possibility that 
individuals and families are not behaving as they do because 
they do not know any better. These families might indeed know 
better than the social planner what best interests them in their 
own. Paternalistic efforts to tamper with that decision making, 
by changing the choice architecture faces families deserve the 
same careful consideration as any other health intervention.
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